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This imbalance is so extreme because of the western universal instrument of contract which is built into the Anglo-American model of companies and the importance of freedom. In Companies, International Trade and Human Rights​[2]​, I wrote that the UK-US model of capitalism  is  the traditional one known as the  neo-liberal economic model which is used to organise companies structures in this country and which informs the structure of many of the biggest corporations in the world. Many scholars believe that the global recession and the financial crisis which hit international money markets shows that we need a different model of economic arrangement. Some people think that it is time to change tack and that the old model  which we follow now to arrange company law  is  bust! The Anglo-American model is now found in many Multinational and Transnational companies even in developing countries although this model is an aggressive mode of capitalism. Now since the shine of neo-liberalism has been tarnished because of the global recession, it is time to reappraise our ideas.. This might be a new reawakening and we should be ready to be at the forefront of the challenge. Despite the argument that there are many different  corporate models in the world and that the Anglo-American model will be  inevitably triumphant, The European socially based model is not finished, it has been around for many years and although comparisons are extremely difficult, since each country has a particular culture and therefore laws which are distinct for that reason. Some scholars have attempted comparisons. Carlin​[3]​ tried to show that the model of corporate governance is not the most important thing, other significant indicators are more crucial. Using a statistical analysis, she firstly uses the slogan ‘The end of history for corporate law’​[4]​ to see whether that it is true. She eventually concludes that it is not, believing that the two models, shareholder versus blockholder system is too simplistic but uses two hypothesis  to test the efficiency of the two systems. She says: “A simplified version of Luigi Zingales’ (2000) typology of models of the firm helps to pin down the origins of the two different views about the role that ownership structures play. The ‘ownership is all about finance’ view arises from the corporate finance literature based on the conception of the firm as a nexus of explicit contracts.  . . Hypothesis 1: Unless inefficient resistance intervenes, shareholder-oriented corporate governance leads to convergence in ownership structures and improved performance. . . . Hypothesis 2: Shareholder-oriented corporate governance reforms lead to country-specific responses.”  After her investigation she concludes . . . “How do the reported empirical patterns relate to our hypothesis? . . .  A major impediment to the evaluation of these hypotheses is the absence to date of detailed descriptive data on how ownership and control patterns have changed over the past decade. The fragmentary evidence on ownership changes and on the engagement of different institutional investors assembled in this chapter suggests that the second hypothesis cannot be revealed out.”​[5]​ Thus the investigation is not conclusive, particularly because of the diversification of the variables. Dignam and Galanis  take a different perspective, they believe that open markets make it inevitable that institutional shareholders will be more powerful than managers in the long term, and also that governments might be unable to stem any change of corporate governance​[6]​.  A different tack was taken by Clerc, who questions the legitimacy of shareholder power. He says that a number of faulty arguments are used by people to augment shareholder legitimacy​[7]​. He argues that many people oppose the shareholder model and wishes to investigate the traditional company  governance structures that we saw in the triumphant literature in which all other models will shrivel.​[8]​ Firstly he remembers that  one fundamental foundation of commercial company structure is the institution of limited liability: “Several theoretic reasons help to explain the enthusiasm for limited liability, but the most important and most obvious is that: it enables shareholders to hope for unlimited profits while risking only limited losses. If this were betting, it would be called a ‘winning formula’.​[9]​ Clerc uses a number of examples to show that society must pay for reorganisations and (appositely) oil spills, he says that this means that shareholders have a moral hazard problem: “From a practical point of views , the result of the principle of non liability is clear: society as a whole plays the role of insurer for the risk taken by the shareholders. After all why not? Is you want a dynamic society, it may be desirable to protect entrepreneurs from the risk they take.”​[10]​  




       Firstly we should say something about the history of the depth to which be were plunged into corruption because of the neo-liberal philosophy and its economic theories and those twisted priorities of properties rights and concepts. The evil of extreme poverty could be truly said to be a sort of corruption which feeds the philosophy of inequality using a twisted freedom concept. In fact there is no settled definition of corruption. “Corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism reserved for life-threatening diseases’​[12]​. The World Bank insists that it ‘has identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development’​[13]​  This is problematic as no-one seems to have found a definition which is universally agreed. Nor is there absolute consensus on what types of behaviour within a loose definition  “Corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism reserved for life-threatening diseases’​[14]​. 
Johnson, however, argues that in some respects there is “too much consensus. The new wave of concern has been driven primarily by business and by international aid and lending institutions. While there is nothing inherently wrong with that, their vision of corruption, like any other, is partial.”​[15]​  Johnson points out that the major anti-corruption players (USAID, World Bank, OECD, UNDP and TI)​[16]​  rarely address differences in the societies whose corruption they seek to cure. Noting the way in which corruption and ant-corruption has emerged on to the international agenda, Samson notes; “In the last five or six years, anti-corruption practices have diffused transnationally and have become organised globally. We have seen the emergence of a world of anti-corruption with its own actors, strategies, resources and practices, with its heroes, victims and villains”​[17]​ Samson moots two possible explanations for this powerful recent emergence of the anti-corruption movement “The fight against corruption is virtuous, and those who form part of the anti-corruption community’ are thus ‘integrity warriors’. The second explanation focuses on the need to increase system rationality; fighting corruption, it is “argued, will make market economies more efficient, state administration more effective, and development resources more accessible.”​[18]​ Pointing out that when anti-corruption norms are applied to projects “’global morality’ [becomes] . . . a social process. It is a process by which virtue is transformed into a specific activity called a project- one which includes formulating a funding strategy, approaching donors, analysing stakeholders, hiring consultants, developing NGOs, conducting project appraisals, making evaluations . . . Anti-corruptionism . . . is a stage in which moral projects are intertwined with money and power.”​[19]​ Because of this “Anti-corruption . . . is not innocent. It can be manipulated to serve the interest of even the most unscrupulous actors.”​[20]​ 
Further, the interdependence of world economies makes the condemnation of certain behaviours one-sided; that is, the behaviour of one set of actors is condemned while those on the other side of the transaction are regarded with complacence. This is the micro prism which informed our individual bargain showing that  the way that tiny imbalances inform huge global differences. As Thomas Pogge points out the belief that corruption is a ‘pathology of primitive nations’ is common to ‘many citizens of the affluent countries’ who hold that the global economic order is not to blame for severe poverty and increasing global inequality; rather “poverty is substantially caused not by global, systemic factors, but – in the countries where it occurs – by their flawed national economic regimes and by their corrupt and incompetent elites, both of which impede national economic growth and a fairer distribution of the national product.”​[21]​ This comforting belief is accompanied by demands that the poor countries must first help themselves by giving themselves respectable political regimes. Since, until imposition of regime change in Iraq, it is not the responsibility of rich nations to impose regimes on others, nothing can be done. Aid, if given, would only be lost to corrupt elites. However these comfortable beliefs “are nevertheless ultimately unsatisfactory, because it portrays the corrupt social institutions and corrupt elites prevalent in the poor countries as an exogenous fact: as a fact that explains, but does not itself stand in need of explanation.”​[22]​ We know that companies are critical in making this imbalance since corporations are so powerful, often more powerful than states. Therefore the culture of companies is crucial in understanding the world that we have and therefore if the theories that informs the structure of companies is corrupt this is a way to change the system. Is the system which we use to found companies corrupt? However, although this article focuses on companies, we should remember that company culture and law are originally made by each nation, from this perspective Pogge is completely able to use his moral deflective devices to use our culture as a scapegoat for companies​[23]​.  Companies are created by laws adopted by societies. Creating a company to obtain or manufacture goods cheaply and to provide investment opportunities means that rich societies are benefiting from the cheap prices obtained for resources from poorer societies, resources here include labour​[24]​. Furthermore the global financial crash should show us that our greed has impoverished the poor and the rich have used the banks and financial industry as a whipping boy for our moral deflective device since our pensions were too large and could not be sustainable. Neverthess, although some pensions have been curtailed many have been completely unaffected. However, this is  an attempt to talk about company structures and the traditional economic philosophy.  
In a brief investigation of corporate culture, MacLennan notes the prevalence of “shared corporate values predicated on the rights of property and the rule of the market”​[25]​ She traces the roots of the current waves of corporate corruption in America to early industrialisation; the inevitable and fundamental conflict between the emergent values of market capitalism and democratic goals to protect the public interest.”​[26]​ MacLennan argues that this conflict was met by a network of regulations creating an American ‘welfare state’ which “not only provides a social safety net for the disadvantage in the economy, but also welfare for the very rich and their corporations.​[27]​ Examining why this system seems to have failed so spectacularly over recent years, MacLennan advances the argument that, while the regulatory system is based on the idea that regulation is needed only during “moments of business failure”​[28]​, the clash of values runs deeper as “Market values, which have their root in a pre-industrial,  liberal society based upon democratic citizenship and agrarian, small business enterprises , have morphed into a new ethic of corporate capitalism which no longer resembles the business culture  of the past.. . . Corporate behaviour in the US has become increasingly ‘corrupt’ and the behaviour of  officials in the Enrons and Worldcoms is not isolated. . . .  it is pervasive and institutionalised. That means, it is more than criminal behaviour by a few bad actors in an otherwise clean enterprise. It is institutionalised in the everyday world-view and processes of corporate action.”​[29]​ MacLennan’s study is into the close networks which link the political and economic elites but also notes that “ Definitions of morality, public interest and personal responsibility in corporate board rooms and executive offices may in fact be quite different from those of the rest of the middle, working and poor classes.”​[30]​ An interesting example of this is Skilling’s belief that he is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. This is unlikely to be mere denial and may well stem from an unholy mixture of the ‘Alpha male entitlement’ syndrome which leads powerful people (not always males to refuse to believe that the rules of ordinary life apply to them and by the fact that by constantly driving up the share price he believes that he was doing precisely the job that the company required in accordance with its aggressive market forces culture. MacLennan insists that “corruption implies something systematic, institutionalised and perhaps endemic to an organisation or culture. It is pervasive, infused or embedded in the system.. . Corrupt or criminal behaviour is individual. If an alleged crime occurs, individuals are held responsible and receive punishment through the courts. But corruption is institutional, patterened – perhaps criminal and unethical from outside, but not necessarily perceived as such by insiders All of the attention to the individual criminal executive is a detaour from figuring out how corruption works. An example is the coverage of the prosecution of Enron’s executives, CEO Jeffery Skilling and Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow. All eyes are on the courtroom . . . and on possible jail sentences – thus isolating the executive as the criminal. The corporate culture that bred corruption, and the social expectations of the elite that ruled the organisation, have escaped scrutiny”​[31]​Let us look at some instances of the Enron culture as translated into action by Skilling; “Skilling introduced a rigorous employee performance assessment process that became known as ‘rank or yank’ under this system the bottom 10 per cent in performance were shown the door. There was heavy pressure to meet targets, and remuneration was linked to the deals done and profits booked in the previous quarter.”​[32]​

“One thing the traders all loved about Enron was the sense they had of operating in the purest environment that had ever been created in corporate America. By pure, they meant that the trading floor operated strictly by the dictates of the free market. The company’s credo had always been that free markets worked best, of course. But the traders grabbed on to that belief with a cult-like fierceness. . . Maximising profit was not inconsistent with doing good, they believed, but an inherent part of it. . .”​[33]​  

 “And always, hovering over everything and everyone at Enron, was Wall Street. . . . In the Skilling era, the stock became . . . Enron’s obsession. A stock ticker in the headquarter’s lobby offered a constant update on the price of Enron shares. TV monitors broadcast CNBC in the building elevators. . . for Skilling himself . . . ‘the stock price was his report card’. When it rose, he was exultant; when it dropped , he was glum”​[34]​ 
“Skilling’s methods of arriving at Enron’s quarterly and annual targets was downright perverse. Instead of going through a rigorous budget process and arriving at a number by analyzing all the business units and their prospects for the coming year as Kinder  used to do, he would impose a number based solely on what Wall Street wanted. He would openly ask the stock analysts “What earnings do you need to keep our stock price up?” And the number he arrived at was the number Wall Street was looking for, regardless of whether internally it made good sense. . . . Invariably, as the quarter drew to a close, Enron’s top executives would realize that they were going to fall short of the number they’d promised Wall Street. . .. when the realisation took place that the company was falling short, its executives undertook a desperate scramble to fill the holes in the company’s earnings.”​[35]​
A similar corruption was evident in the fall of Barings. The lack of supervision of Nick Leeson was attributable in a substantial degree to the feeling that he was ‘the goose’ laying the golden eggs so that stringent enquiries into his activities or limitation of them should be avoided at all costs. 
The US/UK model of companies and corporate law has shareholders as the primary focus; the company must serve the interests of shareholders and directors are appointed and dismissed by shareholders. Nevertheless directors are to act in the interest of the company and usually owe no direct duties to shareholders. This structure does not necessarily equate shareholders with the company nor does it equate shareholder interests with ‘profit maximisation’ and impose a duty on directors to achieve such a goal. Nevertheless recent discourse has imposed the concept of profit maximisation on the assumption that this is what shareholders require and the second assumption that shareholders and the company is one and the same thing. Such an understanding of corporate aims has wide implications for their behaviour since all considerations other than profit are seen as ‘negative externalities’ to be adhered to or to be bargained away if possible. There is no doubt that this philosophy was one of the underlying causes of spectacular bankruptcies such as Enron and WorldCom. 
	Pogge’s concept of ‘moral deflection device,’ it is essentially a way to deflect a morally inconvenient truth because rich humans prefer wealth rather than moral duties.  In terms of moral responsibility the traditional construct of corporations means that they become another method of moral deflection: because the purpose of corporations is to make as much money as possible. Those who tolerate and profit from their existence have no responsibility for the methods they pursue. This ignores the fact not only that companies are structured by national laws but also that those who profit from an activity have a responsibility to prevent that activity harming others. While the damage of the poor nations and the catastrophic raping of the environment are desperate, we need to focus more particularly on the structure of corporations and their governance. There are two misnomers at the root of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance system: one is the illusion of a contractual foundation for companies and the second is the belief that shareholders hold property in the company​[36]​. I tried to show that one mistake in the contractual model is the way that once the articles of incorporation have been drafted the promoters are redundant. After the company business’s starts all sorts of the stakeholders have a part to play. Thus the contractual model is an illusion​[37]​. Other scholars have also been worried by the nexus of contracts concept. So is Clerc 
 “The theory of the nexus of contacts (which I shall refer to as ‘nexism’’ for the sake of convenience), proceeds differently, . . . On the ground that legal entity is a fiction, nexism defined the company as “ a set of complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among  themselves” (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991, p. 12).​[38]​”  Clerc realises that the company is a fiction but for this theory he is happy to understand there are other institutions which are also fictional but have a profound influence on people.​[39]​ He is more interested by the range of the contracts which are supposed to make the company work: “a theory, which places contracts at the heart of its analysis, is only worthwhile if it examines the real conditions of negotiation, execution and termination of those contracts. In particular, the following questions can be raised. What is the negotiation position of each party (for example, do employees have the choose of whether or not to work, do investors have the choice between investment and consumption) . . .”​[40]​ In fact Clerc is mischievous since the whole philosophy which he calls ‘primacism’​[41]​ is predicated on a sole stakeholder, the shareholders. In a way the contractual device is not useful for primacism as I wrote earlier, because once the company has been founded, the real business starts, and also what about in a contractual context if the company has only a single shareholder​[42]​? In fact a contractual theory harks back to tired philosophy rather than looking forward to reflexive theories which have a more inclusive reach, using writers and scholars like Teubner or Luhmann​[43]​. As Teubner rightly says:
“Putting it quite bluntly, a corporate enterprise does not exist simply as a self serving and self-realizing institution for the unique benefits of its shareholders and workers, but rather exists, above all, to fulfill a broader role in society.”​[44]​
  
Indeed, large companies have a huge influence  on our social, economic and political lives. In the words of Chayes, “[T]hey are repositories of power, the biggest centers of nongovernmental power in our society.”​[45]​ In the UK, the influence of companies is just as evident as in the United States. The food we eat is dependent on how it is grown, processed, packaged, advertised and sold to us. Every one of these stages is determined or influenced by companies. Increasingly companies are involved in the provision of public services with the government having created mechanisms such as private finance initiatives, and more recently the proposals for community interest companies. Such mechanisms are recognition of the influence of companies and their role in society. In such a context it seems that the two company law assumptions that share the structure of company law and corporate governance are not only anachronistic but in fact wholly inaccurate in their representation of the character of companies today. Teubner argues for a proceduralization of fiduciary duties that enables non-shareholder interest-groups to participate in the monitoring and decision-making functions. The role of the law, in Teubner’s view should be to control indirectly internal organizational structures, through external regulation. The role of the law is external mobilization of internal control resources.​[46]​ The organizational structures should allow for “discursive unification processes as to allow the optimal balancing of company performance and company function by taking into account the requirements of the non-economic environment.” In short, Teubner advocates a constitutionalization of the private corporation to make the corporate conscience work “if that meant to force the organization to internalize outside conflicts in the decision structure itself in order to take into account the non-economic interests of workers, consumers, and the general public.”​[47]​ Teubner highlights the role of disclosure, audit, justification, consultation and negotiation and the duty to organize. He emphasizes the need to proceduralize. Ultimately, the point is to ensure that the decision-making processes allow participation by those affected by the decisions, whether in terms of profit, consumer choice, working conditions, or environmental impact of corporate activities. If the decisions are made jointly with the directors the monitoring role ought to reduce. Teubner’s proceduralization would mean a complete change in conceptualization of the company and directors’ duties. 
	  The following section of this article tries to put some flesh on the bones’ of a skeleton of company structure, in the context of a new look at UK company law. As many have realized, the crunch is the way that directors should prioritize the stakeholders’ cut. Much angst has been written in this quest and there is not yet a solution. This difficulty is one of the most stubborn problems and one of the reasons that the traditional theory endures so strongly. Clerc says; “Given the many doubts inherent in the shareholder primary theory, one may wonder how it has succeeded in becoming dominant-although it has never ceased to be contested.”​[48]​ Unfortunately one of this extremely intractable problem means that the ‘Single Master​[49]​’ theory has lingered. There seems no other solution: “In stakeholder theory, the managers must take into account not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and so on. Because of the divergences between these different groups, the managers cannot make a rational decision, and so favour their own specific interest.​[50]​” This problem might be one of the reasons for the huge inequality between managers and employees. “This year, the numbers speak for themselves: while the business world reeled from the worst self-inflicted recession in a generation, those at the top continued to reward themselves disproportionately. Although direct bonuses were hit by the stock market crash, boards compensated by pushing up their salaries three times faster than average pay elsewhere in the country and relied instead on a growing range of fringe benefits such as cash in lieu of pension contributions. Those at the very top, particularly the ten best paid directors in the survey, beat all records. For the first time, the entire FTSE100 directors pay themselves more than £1 billion​[51]​”.
Rank	Name	Company	Job title	Total salary package, £m
1 	Bart Becht 	Reckitt Benckiser 	CEO 	36.76 
2 	Aidan Heavey 	Tullow Oil 	CEO 	28.84 
3 	Chip Goodyear 	BHP Billiton 	CEO 	23.82 
4 	Sir Martin Sorrell 	WPP 	CEO 	19.71 
5 	Bob Diamond 	Barclays 	President 	17.48 
6 	Stanley Fink 	Man Group 	Non-Executive 	15.38 
7 	Trevor Reid 	Xstrata 	Finance Director 	15.34 
8 	Arun Sarin 	Vodafone 	CEO 	13.75 
9 	Santiago Zaldumbide 	Xstrata 	Executive 	12.56 
10 	Graham Martin 	Tullow Oil 	Executive 	11.44 
11 	John Pluthero 	Cable & Wireless 	CEO 	10.63 
12 	Jean-Pierre Garnier 	GSK 	CEO 	10.33 
13 	Frank Chapman 	BG Group 	CEO 	10.1 
14 	Paul Pindar 	Capita 	CEO 	9.86 
15 	Matthew O'Donoghue 	Tullow Oil 	Executive 	9.21 
16 	Sir Terry Leahy 	Tesco 	CEO 	9.11 
17 	Mike Turner, CBE 	BAE Systems 	CEO 	7.22 
18 	Brad Mills 	Lonmin 	CEO 	7.2 
19 	Manny Fontenla-Novoa 	Thomas Cook 	CEO 	7.04 
20 	Jeroen van der Veer 	Royal Dutch Shell 	CEO 	7.02 
21 	Michael Spencer 	ICAP 	CEO 	6.73 
22 	Michael McLintock 	Prudential 	Executive 	6.61 
23 	Paul Adams 	British American Tobacco 	CEO 	6.4 
24 	Mark Bristow 	Randgold Resources 	CEO 	6.28 










 Can the model of Shareholder ‘primacism’ be ousted? One possibility for changing the template might be  a concession company law model.  Concession theory in its simplest form views the existence and operation of the company as a concession by the state, which grants the ability to use the corporate form too, particularly where it operates with limited liability.​[53]​ Thus the Charter of the Newfoundland Company:
“. . . thinking it a matter and action well becoming a Christian King to make true use of that which God from the beginning created for mankind . . . therefore do of our special grace certain knowledge and mere motion . . . give grant and confirm by these presents unto [various persons] their heirs and assigns, and to such and so many as they do or shall hereafter admit to be joined with them in form hereafter . . . That they shall be one body or communality perpetual, and shall have perpetual succession, and one common steal to serve for said body. . .”​[54]​
 As we have seen it is a trite observation that the Anglo-American​[55]​ model of companies​[56]​ has been extremely powerful, creating mega empires which have huge economies. The US/UK model of companies and corporate law has shareholders as the primary focus; the company must serve the interests of shareholders and directors are appointed and dismissed by shareholders. Nevertheless directors are bound to act in the interest of the company and usually owe no direct duties to shareholders. This structure does not necessarily equate shareholders with the company nor does it equate shareholder interests with ‘profit maximisation’ and impose a duty on directors to achieve such a goal. Nevertheless recent discourse has imposed the concept of profit maximisation on the assumption that this is what shareholders require and the second assumption that shareholders and the company is  the same  thing. Such an understanding of corporate aims has wide implications for their behaviour since all considerations other than profit are seen as ‘negative externalities’ to be adhered to or to be bargained away if possible. There is no doubt that this philosophy was one of the underlying causes of spectacular bankruptcies such as Enron and WorldCom
As we have seen this Anglo-American model is simple, modelled on a contractual pattern. Although we have seen that the definition of ‘contractual’ is unclear, roughly it means that the principal negotiators together  design a company, this means that all of the investments and the profit of the enterprise belongs to the members. This model therefore has been in the forefront of the philosophy which became the traditionally economic model, free markets, the Washington Consensus, the neo-liberal economists construct. The Anglo-American model of companies antedated the Washington Consensus but it coincided with the worst aggressive sort of it. Particularly important  it has in it the philosophy of deregulation which allowed huge corporate empires. An excellent history of neoliberalism is found in Glinavos:
“How, then, did a specifically neoliberal version of capitalism built on an  essentially American model of ‘laissez-faire’ become the strand of western free market ideology that won the day. . .  it examines the theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism, focusing in particular on its underlying assumptions that markets are natural; that the rationality of their operations is threatened by governments intervention ; that the role of law is limited ; that law should be subordinate to markets needs; that the ‘invisible hand’ of the market not only ensures efficiency  but also distributive justice.”​[57]​ What this means for companies is that the shareholders are Kings, profit maximisation is the goal despite the fact that no company law ever says that it must be so.​[58]​ The consequences are clear many testaments are written showing the denigration of the environment, bad labour practices, the displacement of domestic production, the undermining of political systems and the effect of the banking of international money systems​[59]​. 

As we have seen from the ancient charter companies like the Newfoundland Company, the traditional concessionl model was started by Queens or Kings to allow trade in the colonies, where sovereigns wanted territories and treasures, in exchange thrusting entrepreneurs were allowed to trade in goods.  Of course the sovereign took most of the money, but the entrepreneurs also got rich. However the company and its directors had to be sure that the regulations which the sovereign made were meticulously kept, because otherwise the sovereign would be enraged and the sanctions would be savage. 
Now this model is an old fashioned one. Now, modern concession company theorists use a different understanding of the foundation of companies with some particularly using a bottom-up concept which says that stakeholders are crucial for the foundation of companies.
 There are a number of strands of stakeholder theorists who believe that there is a living entity in companies, and all stakeholders are privy to the enterprise. Thus companies are a social and political entity.​[60]​ In some ways stakeholder theory embraces the “organic” view of companies.​[61]​ The organic analysis is borrowed from the analysis of states. Wolff​[62]​ cites John Caspar Bluntschli who “found something corresponding in the life of the State not only to every part of the human body but even to every human emotion, and designated e.g., the foreign relations of a State as its sexual impulses!​[63]​”
Stakeholders are part of a company even though the shareholders and directors are the paramount managers of the company and administrate the bureaucracy. Employees, customers, consumers, local residents, and many others are within the corporate sphere of influence.​[64]​ However there is another stronger theory which holds that the company is derived from society i.e that concession theory is entirely a bottom up theory. In 2000 I suggested I different sort of model arrangement for companies.​[65]​ I called this the ‘dual concession theory’, the idea was that it should be structured from the bottom. i.e instead of the monarch being  the sovereign fount for the enterprise, society itself should be the and remain foundation for companies. That would mean that the community should have the power to change the organisation and the structure of companies. Companies would be derived from  and socially responsible to the democratically organisation community of people. This is a variety of a social contract idea theory.​[66]​ However it has important implications, it is an expression of the search for a new definition of democratically shared ‘common’ (good) beyond the traditional public-private distinction​[67]​. Perhaps the dual concession approach  is similar to Ruggie’s idea of a social licence for companies​[68]​. Ruggie doesn’t use examples to tell us how companies could be reformed. He hides in human rights speech, and particularly using egregious violations to illuminate the problem. His report is entitled: “Business and Human Rights: Towards operationizing the “protect, respect and remedy” Framework”​[69]​ It is not fair to expect that the construction of companies would be in a ‘framework document, I hope that Ruggie’s work will have more detailed consideration and be published later. However the radical hypothesis that I suggest has within it a plan which could revolutionise democracy. We are used to a settled idea of democracy which takes a passive voting based situation to allow  governments to define and run the economy, a company structure that actively tells companies how we want goods and services to work would be a fundamental change. 
Tilly says that democracy is a process, rather than a thing, a dynamic happening.​[70]​  Unfortunately although many theorists understand that it would be an excellent democratic ideal, very few have imagined how this might pan out in the real world. This section will attempt to fill up some of this skeleton. 

	The Company Law Act 2006​[71]​
How can companies be reformed in a democratic way? One possibility for a breakthrough could be the new UK Companies Law Act 2006 which has an interesting definition of director’s duties, but we do not know yet what the definition actually means, there are not yet any cases about directors’ duties. Section 172 of the Companies Law Act 2006 says that directors have a duty to the company to act in a way, “in good faith, to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.” To do this the director is told that they are to have ‘regard’ to a range of other matters; “the consequences of any decisions in the long term; the company’ employees; the need to foster the company’s business relationship with suppliers, customers; and others, the impact of the company’s operation of the community and the environment; the desirability of the company’s maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and the need to act fairly between members of the company”. It looks wonderful, but, the rub is in Subsection (1) and (2) where the other interests are clearly shown to be minimal, the paramount interest is focused on the shareholders. We don’t know whether the judges will change the traditional focus of shareholder interests​[72]​ by changing the importance of the other stakeholders. The Human Rights fraternity uses a rubric for encapsulate the crucial rights. They use a slogan which reads; “protect, respect, fulfill”. I think that this human rights idea is stronger that the concept in the directors’ duty in the Company Law Act 2006. ‘Respect’ is stronger than ‘regard’  I think that the judges might not understand that the Act has supposed to be a radical shake up of old concepts. The dual concession idea, as a bottom-up concession theory, is a strong version of stakeholder theory and rests on a similar premise. Stakeholder theorists believe that there are two categories of stakeholder, a primary stakeholder whose interest is more crucial because the stakeholders’ participation could threaten the company, that is, the company could not survive their involvement.​[73]​ Normally they are the shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers. Some theorists include “public stakeholder group: the governments and communities that provide infrastructures and markets, whose laws and regulations must be obeyed, and to whom taxes and other obligations may be due”​[74]​. Other academics exclude this category. Secondary stakeholders are then the media, special interests groups and perhaps competitors. The differences in the theories are in the way that the stakeholders are to be allowed to be part of the company. Stakeholder theory says that the company is the fount of the enterprise, instead the stakeholders the dual concession says that society i.e stakeholders are the company. The traditional stakeholder theory has the   focus on the company and, in a way, the stakeholders in that theory, are allowed to be a part of the company, a sort of a charitable concept, where directors are the top-cats, allowing the interests to be shared. On the other hand some scholars believe that the stakeholders are so important that their interests should be an end rather than a means​[75]​, i.e. the company would be subsumed by the stakeholders. This is a radical idea, but it might mean that it would get rid of capitalism, a rather startling idea. It seems that the profit motive would be completely lost, since each stakeholder interest would be and end in itself. That would mean, for example, would employees’s interests be paramount?  Would their wages be an end itself? How would the balance be struck? This is the intractable problem. I think that this theory is not practical.  
However, there is another interesting approach which rests on a new economic theory which has been coined because neo-liberalism has been discredited. Neoliberalism  assumes all people (rational actors)  want more and more money and goods. We now know what fuelled the consumer boom and lent to the world-wide financial crisis. The new theory is named behavioural economics. In fact, the concept is not as simple as the Kantian idea in the issues in this paragraph, the balances of the interests are managed by proportionality. The management will have implicit and explicit limits and if any stakeholder’s interest is legitimate, and if the managers denigrate any legitimate stakeholder interest this should lead to sanctions​[76]​. However this also leaves problems, because there are significant wiggle rooms in these concepts, indeed, a number of words in this theory is implicit on these; “proportionality; implicit and explicit limits; legitimate interests; etc”. I believe that this theory and the dual concession theory of companies are very similar but it would  be excellent  to unpack these weasel words, to really understand which risk each stakeholders might lose. I know that the financial crisis has rocked the credibility of the FSA (Financial Services Authority)`	​[77]​, but there was a simple equation which the FSA used which might still be credible. Of course, assessment of risk is a complex business even if it be accepted that it can be achieved with any degree of objectivity​[78]​. The technical perception of risk as objective and measurable is loosing ground: "the view that a separation can be maintained between 'objective' risk and 'subjective' and perceived risk has come under increasing attack, to the extent that it is no longer a mainstream position . . . Assessments of risk, whether they are based upon individual attitudes, the wider beliefs within a culture, or on the models of mathematical risk assessment, necessarily depend on human judgment."​[79]​, these points to the necessity for directors to exercise their skill and judgment in assessing the exposure of their particular concerns. The FSA created a ‘Risk Assessment’ approach to regulation.​[80]​ The risk posed by a firm to the FSA's objectives​[81]​ will be assessed by ‘scoring’ probability and impact factors. Probability factors take account of the likelihood of the risk happening and impact factors assess the ‘scale and significance’ of the harm should the risk occur. The FSA expresses it as:
	Priority = impact x probability​[82]​. 
What I would like to see is to use all of the interests of the director’s duties mentioned 
by the legislation (Company Law Act 2006) turned into a risk assessment of each 
interest. For example, what does it mean to analyse the company’s risk vis a vis 
employees? Of course, remuneration would be a significant focus, but many theorists 
have realized that the community where workers live is at least as important as a hike 
of wages. Similarly employees have families and this is an important facet for thriving 
companies.

 Legal Risk Allocation​[83]​

It is vital that when designing company law, there must be an attempt to arrive at an abstract evaluation of the interests at stake so that the regulatory systems could be understood as a framework which held the balance between the competing interests. At the heart of making suitable choices for regulation is a series of options concerning the risks undertaken by participants in reorganisation of corporations. This does not make choices simple as is evident in the light of the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the issue of risk, especially in the regulation of market economies.​[84]​ Black​[85]​ contrasts "technical perceptions" of risk with psychological or social accounts of risk. Technical perceptions "tend to the view that risks are ultimately measurable and controllable" whereas psychological or social accounts of risk "emphasise that risk is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be reduced to mere products of probability and consequences".​[86]​ Psychological perception of risk may vary according to the ability of those at risk to undertake it voluntarily rather than have it imposed upon them and the "extent to which they are perceived to pose a threat to valued social and institutional arrangements".​[87]​ It is clear that in seeking to regulate risk addressing some extremely complex questions with significant political and cultural roots is necessary.​[88]​ 
	A series of questions must be asked:
1) Who is at risk?
2) What is their moral claim to protection?
3) The degree and nature of the risk?







In a market economy there are risks inherent in all commercial transactions; a simple sale of a car may end with the customer dissatisfied with the performance of the vehicle and the seller dissatisfied with the payment. The role of the law is to provide some mechanism for balancing the competing claims against each other. The management of corporations is no exception to this rule, indeed by introducing a legal person into the equation the management of risk becomes more complex, not least because the participating groups in corporations may not be a single interest group but may contain competing elements. Thus, for example, shareholders do not necessarily share exactly the same interests, a group of ordinary voting shareholders may have interests diametrically opposed to those of non-voting preference shareholders. Similarly a minority shareholder may be in peril of being outvoted and disadvantaged by those in the majority. Creditors have competing priority claims and employees may have different interests depending on their geographical place of work and their position in the company. In seeking to protect a particular interest group it is therefore vital to identify with precision the interest group or individual that is at risk when any change takes place. 


2.	The Moral Claim to Protection

Companies in a market economy exist to encourage risk-taking behaviour by spreading the risk amongst a number of participants who may only invest a small amount, and protecting them by allowing some companies to operate with limited liability. If we take shareholders as a homogenous group we can see already that their moral claim to protection as shareholders depends on a complex evaluation of the degree to which entrepreneurial behaviour is to be encouraged in a particular society and the extent to which they are already protected by such mechanisms as limited liability. In assessing the answer to this question two levels must therefore be identified; the fundamental purpose of corporations in particular economies and the extent to which the law has already "rigged the market" in favour or against a particular interest group. For example, while shareholders enjoy some protection by reason of the limited liability of companies, creditors undertake greater risks in contracting with limited liability corporations. Thus the very existence of limited liability corporate organisations has already interfered with the distribution of risk inherent in individual commercial contracts. Much has been written on the role which corporations do and should serve within society​[89]​, suffice it to say here that there is a fundamental tension between a goal of making as much money as possible and serving other goals​[90]​, for example providing employment, serving a local economy and protecting the environment.
The balance between these differing goals can be fundamentally affected by the way in which the law allocates risk between the various participants in companies. While US corporations have tended to espouse profit maximisation as a paramount goal,​[91]​ thus minimising shareholder risk at the expense of other participants in the commercial venture, the countries of the European Union have, in general, espoused the view that a more balanced approach to the allocation of risk within commercial enterprises is proper and has therefore followed a more protective approach to creditors and employees.
Article 50​[92]​ of the EC Treaty requires "co-ordination to the necessary extent [of] the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms." The important words in this context are "members and others". As Edwards points out the wording gives rise to "obvious scope for debate as to what is necessary and why: the spectrum ranges from the view that only a minimum level throughout the Community is necessary to the view that all members, creditors and employees of companies established throughout the Community should benefit from uniform rights."​[93]​ As Gower points out the reference to "others" "has historically been taken to include at least creditors and employees."​[94]​ This has also tended to have the effect of protecting local communities as the protective measures militate against complete mobility of corporations.  This is in contrast with, for example the Neoliberalism model where corporations were seen to serve the shareholders’ interests exclusively. These considerations raise fundamental questions of how to strike the balance between permitting and encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour aimed at profit maximisation and the protection of vulnerable participants.​[95]​ 


 3.	The Degree of Risk and its Nature

Again side stepping the complexities of perceived risk it is necessary to have some understanding of what it is that each interest group has at risk. The risks differ even amongst particular interest groups. For example, it is important to understand that shareholders are not an homogenous group; they may have different interests according to the rights attached to their shares. An ordinary shareholder whose dividend rights are subject to surplus being available after the payment of a set amount to a preference shareholder clearly has interests differing substantially from that preference shareholder. Similarly, a shareholder may be less interested in the economic risks of a reorganisation and more interested in the risk of loss of control over a particular enterprise. Creditors will have different interests dependent on how their debt is secured, what priority they can claim over others with a stake in the assets of the company. The categories of participants at risk must therefore be scrutinised with some subtlety. The nature of the risk is also an important consideration. Laws often take a very stringent view on protecting citizens from damage to their physical safety. The degree of protection which is given to financial risk may be much less. Similarly, some balance has to be struck between protecting employees against the risk of losing their livelihood and with it possibly their community and psychological well-being and protecting shareholders from the risk of less gain or perhaps even loss of a financial nature.


4.	What Mechanisms and Institutions Are Available to Regulate?





.    

 	We know which interests are in the forefront in our questioning, because our template is the directors’ duties in the Company Law 2006. The other questions in this paragraph are a subject of more research, In this part of the article, the second question is highlighted and particularly consumers and shareholders as stakeholders, and the possibility that the risk of each stakeholder should be reassessed in a radical way. This might change their vulnerable status as the moral claim to protection might diminish i.e if consumers and shareholders are altruistic they would become more risk averse since other people will become more important than they are. Similarly if the company wants to regard the environment as a stakeholder, shareholders and consumers will themselves have to regard the environment.    As we know, two of the foundations of the principles of the Chicago economists’ theory are competition   and efficiency. The key of these is market forces but the ideology is unfortunately flawed because other crucial principles are left behind. The concept of altruism and community vanished.  Much research of the behavioural economists has showed that people do not necessarily want to maximise their possessions. Other ethical and spiritual values are also important. This is different from the neo-classical Chicago University idea: “Neo-Classical economic Theory has a dim view on humanity- individuals singularly purse their economic self-interest.”​[97]​  Essentially the concept means each individual is motivated by their material wealth i.e. things. The behavioural economists no not believe that is the only motivation of people. The research of experiments have been  clear, there is another side of people, particularly their altruistic side; “substantial fractions of most populations adhere to rules, willingly give to others, and punish those  who offend standards of appropriate behaviour, even at a coat to themselves and with no expectation of material reward.”​[98]​ 
 The empirical experiments are fascinating, just two are in the Ultimatum Game where “one person is given some money, and must offer another person some portion thereof. If the other person accepts the offer, both get to keep the money. If the other person rejects the offered amount, neither gets any money. 















If one transfer her money, but the other does not, then the sharer losses out. She gets nothing, while the recipient gets £20. Neo-classical economist theory predicts that both playing pursuing their economic self-interest should not cooperate; they instead will keep their £10. Instead many test subjects cooperate in such situation.” 
The idea that  people are not always self-interested has significant consequences for  corporate social responsibility; “Neoclassical economic theory predicts that financial incentives should motive and penalties should deter behaviour. But the behavioural economics literature shows that individual may act from an intrinsic motivation, independent of any financial reward or penalty. At tomes financial incentives may have the opposite effect.”​[100]​
These concepts could be merged in a risk analysis to show how society could view companies, using a sophisticated   risk analysis.
The UK Company Law Act 2006 could be a vehicle for showing how companies could be structurally changed. This Act might show that more stakeholders than shareholders are impacted by companies and society. The most intractable problem for stakeholder theory is to find a way to parcel up the interests equitably. The priorities are complex and difficult.  The behavioural economists have shown that all of us are altruistic actors in a community. However trying to find a balance between all of the interests in companies will need more than words, what will be needed is proportionality and equity. Risk and analysis might be the key.
	If the radical proposals in this part, are too fundamental, simultaneously another way of changing companies’ structure is to use a different power base to leverage the state to enact essential model legislation preventing corporate violations.  This might rest on Ruggie’s concepts of social licence. Ruggie’s report rests on three pillars: the duty of states protect against Human Rights abuses, particularly via effective regulation, more respect of Human Rights, via Corporate Social Responsibility, meaning not infringing on other’s rights, and by more  and greater impact for effective remedies for victims. The pillars complement each other​[101]​.  
 	Ruggie’s report concludes​[102]​ that the best entities for remedying abuse of corporate Human Rights violations are Governments, but I am not sure that it is true. One problem is the difficulty of showing that often governments and companies have a symbiotic arrangement, a sort of a cosy relation. Unfortunately, government need companies because the government’s finance is not only crucial but all-important for the state and companies make money, in fact the GNP of countries are heavily indebted to companies.  Therefore government are in a conflict of interest situation, this is one of the formidable tasks that corporate Human Rights and ethical campaigners activists are set. 
If the UK Company Act 2006 could be a template for European or international company reform, research should be focused on the risk run by stakeholders. It should be  possible to devise a project which centred on each stake holder’s concern individually, but  this will be a huge undertaking, perhaps one powerful coalition of stakeholders which could quickly make companies more responsive to ordinary people is an alliance of shareholders and consumers.  
It seems though, that another agency will be necessary to cut the Gordian knot, what could this be? I suggest, what is necessary is a new power base to challenge the traditional power bases, i.e corporations and governments and their mastery. We know that government will be weak in promoting ethical principles and  this is one of the difficulties of having the Westphalian system, which is particularly acute in the Human Right system. However there are other power bases which are not dependent of states and governments, and which are international. Two of them are social movements​[103]​ and consumers, and particularly ethical customers. Both of these movements are interlinked and, although they are nebulous in their aims, they are roughly inline with anti-corporate greed. The aims of both of the movements are completely global, which gets rid of the corporate veil problems and the crucial issues of extraterritoriality in jurisdictions. The Ruggie report indicated that the ‘social licence’ which allows companies to operate is international, there are a huge activism in the internet using blogs, twitters, NGOs publications, this means that company violations of Human Rights are quickly noted, but this is not enough to build a power base. All of them might be right minded, (and this is not necessarily true) but the outrage is unfocussed.   The social movements are wider than the ethical buying campaign, and perhaps it should be fine-tuned to make the negotiations more powerful. One of the best social movement’s well defined parts is the ethical consumer movement and the FairTrade system which is becoming quite powerful. The Special Representative (Ruggie) talks about the possibility of due diligence in preventing Human Rights abuses, and suggests a risk assessment system, since companies use risk analysis often. The difficulty is in the implementation of the normal business of profiteering and which organ would be powerful enough to stop violations during profit seeking? Ruggie says that this  should be left to four elements; “The four core elements of human rights due diligence were outlined in his 2008 report: having a human rights policy, assessing human rights impacts of company activities, integrating those values and findings into corporate cultures and management systems, and tracking as well as reporting performance.”​[104]​  
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